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RECENT CASES
HUSBAND

AND

WiFE-PAnTNERSHIP-TORT

or

PAiTiNEE-LIABnILITY

OF

EACH. The defendants, husband and wife, owned a car jointly. The plaintiff was injured because of the wife's negligence. He alleged in his complaint and defendants by their answer admitted "that at the time plaintiff
alighted from said street car, an automobile owned by said defendants,
George C. Grandy and wife, and operated for their use and benefit was
" No proof was introduced
being driven by defendant, Alma M. Grandy
as to the purpose for which the automobile was being driven. Held. The
husband was liable on the theory that the husband and wife were partners, and the wife was acting as the agent of the partnership. Anderson
v. Grandy, 54 Wash. Dec. 394, 283 Pac. 186 (1929).
A partnership is a contract of two or more competent persons to place
their money, efforts, labor and skill, or some or all of them, in lawful
commerce or business and to divide the profit and bear the loss in certain
proportions. Kelly v. Bourne, 15 Ore. 476, 16 Pac. 40 (1887). A mere
agreement by two persons to buy an article together does not amount
to an agreement to form a partnership, where there is no agreement for a
joint sale of the property and a sharing of profits and losses. Harris v.
Umsted, 75 Ark. 499, 96 S. W 146 (1906)
A reasonable interpretation of the allegations and admissions in the
pleadings is that each joint owner of the car was benefited by his or her
use thereof. This was the object of the joint ownership. Such a purpose
should not be construed as the "business" of a partnership, since no dealing with third parties was intended. Burdick on Partnership, 2d Ed. p. 27.
It seems this relation should not be viewed as a partnership for the further
reason that the wife is not competent to form a partnership with her husband in this state. Board of Trade'v. Hayden, 4 Wash. 263, 30 Pac. 87, 31
Am. St. Rep. 919, 16 L. R. A. 530.
In support of its decision in the principal case the court cites the case
of Cowart v. Lewis, 151 Miss. 221, 117 So. 531 (1928). In that case the
spouses, as here, owned a car jointly. While on a pleasure trip for the
mutual enjoyment of both, the wife was driving and the husband was
seated beside her. He saw that she was driving in a negligent manner,
and heard the remonstrances of the other occupants. The court held the
husband liable on the theory that the negligence of the wife was imputed
to the husband, but stated in its decision, "Pretermitting a decision of the
question of the agency relationship alleged to exist between the appellant
and his wife, because such a decision is not necessary for the determination of this question, we are yet of the opinion the appellant (husband)
is liable." The Cowart case appears to be decided on the doctrine of joint
enterprise, in which the husband had the right, either express or implied,
to exercise control over his wife in the management of the automobile.
As a general proposition of law, the doctrine of respondeat superior
applies only when the relation of master and servant is shown to exist
between the wrongdoer and the person sought to be charged with the injury resulting from the wrong at the time and mn respect of the very
transaction out of which the injury arose, the servant acting within the
scope and course of his employment. Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. Law. 754,
The rule is founded on the
71 Atl. 296, 19 L. R. A. (n.s.) 296 (1908).
superintendence and control which the master is supposed to exercise over
his servant. Maximilian v. Mayor, 62 N. Y. 160, 20 Am. Rep. 468 (1875)
The doctrine of joint enterprise has a similar foundation, the right of
those engaged therein to control each other's acts. Cotton v. Willmar &
Sioux Falls Ry. Co., 99 Minn. 366, 109 N. W 835, 8 L. R. A. (n.s.) 643
It is therefore consistent with the general proposition above
(1906).
stated. Joint ownership, in itself, of a chattel does not contemplate the
right of one joint owner to superintendence and control over the acts of
the other in respect to the chattel. Mills et al. v. Malott, 43 Ind. 248
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(1873) The decision in the instant case fails to distinguish between joint
ownership and joint enterprise.
S. L.
TAXATION-CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw-Dur

PROCESS-SITUS

OF BONDS-IN-

TANGIBLES. Taylor, domiciled in New York, owned and kept within that
state negotiable bonds issued by Minnesota and municipalities of that
state. None had any connection with business carried on by or for Taylor
in Minnesota. He died testate in New York, where his will was probated
and his estate administered. New York imposed a tax on the testamentary
transfer and Minnesota sought to do likewise. The Supreme Court of the
latter state upheld the tax, but it was appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. Held, reversing the judgment in and expressly overruling Blackstone v. Miller 188 U. S. 189, 47 L. ed. 439, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep.
277 (1902) Minnesota could not assess an inheritance tax on the transfer of public securities owned by a non-resident decedent and kept in his
possession in the state of his domicile. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v.
Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 47 L. ed. 439, 50 Sup. Ct. Rep. 98 (1930) Stone, J.,
concurring, Holmes and Brandeis, 3. 3., dissenting.
The previous rule was that ordinarily choses in action were subject to
taxation both at the debtor's domicile and at the domicile of the creditor.
Blackstone v. Miller sitpra. But under the facts of the principal case the
state of the debtor's domicile was refused the privilege because it had
been legally exercised by the state of the creditor. Such a holding suggests
that the court is preparing to extend the doctrine of immunity from
double taxation to intangibles, and in fact they said that "We have determined that in general intangibles may be properly taxed at the domicile
of their owner and we can find no sufficient reason for saying that they
are not entitled to enjoy an immunity against taxation at more than one
place similar to that accorded to tangibles." But for the court to lay
down such a rule would seem to be discovering a new concept in the
meaning of the due process clause of our Constitution.
The holding of the principal case is decidedly out of harmony with the
previous decisions of the Court. New York was allowed to tax the testamentary transfer of notes merely left in that state for safe-keeping by a
non-resident decedent, although the state of the latter's domicile also levied
a tax. Wheeler v. Sohmer 233 U. S. 434. 58 L. ed. 1030, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep.
607 (1913)
Where the evidence of the debt is in another state, which
may assess a testamentary tax, the state of the owner's domicile may
likewise tax the transfer. Blodgett v. Sibberm an, 277 U. S. 1, 72 L. ed.
749, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410 (1719)
States which created corporations issuing
stocks which form part of the estate of a deceased person may impose a tax
upon the transfer irrespective of the owner's domicile or the actual situs
of the stock certificates. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 69 L. ed.
1058, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603, 42 A. L. R. 316 (1924)
What the effect of the holding of the principal case on these and similar
decisions will be, it is impossible to say It may well be contended, however, that double taxation of the transfer of intangibles may often be
justified. For example, the succession to shares of corporate stock might
reasonably be taxed in the state of incorporation; Frick v. Pennsylvania,
supra, the state where the certificates were permanently kept; Wheeler
v. Sohmer supra, and the state of the decedent's domicile; Blodgett -v.
Sibberman, supra.
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of Washington strongly
relied on Blaekstone v. Miller supra, overruled by the principal case, in
recently holding that the state has power "to levy an inheritance tax on
movable personal property owned by a person who dies domiciled in this
state, regardless of the situs of the property or whether it is tangible or
intangible in nature." In re Sherwood's Estate, 122 Wash. 648, 211 Pac.
734 (1922).
S. B.
NUISANCE-ACTS

LAKE.

OR CONDUCT CAUSING NUISANCE-AMUSEMENT

PARK ON

Lake Burien, about forty acres in extent, situated in a rather thickly
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settled community a few miles from Seattle, is entirely surrounded by
privately owned property. Defendant proposes to use his property, which
has a two hundred foot frontage on the lake, for an amusement resort, having already installed parking space for two hundred automobiles, picnic
tables and stoves, a boathouse, bathhouse and diving platform. He intends
to install usual playground equipment, swings, slides, etc. He does not
intend to install a dancing pavilion, merry-go-round or other noise making
amusement, nor to allow intoxicating liquor on the premises. He intends to
close at nine o'clock every evening. Lake Burien has no outlet, and is
fed probably exclusively from surface water. The County Health Officer
testified that in his opinion the lake is too small to be safely used as
a public bathing resort. Plaintiffs, owners of property bordering on the
lake, asked that defendant be enjoined from opening his amusement resort.
Held. If reasonable grounds exist to believe the proposed use will result
in a nuisance, the court will not require the plaintiff to wait until the
injury is inflicted, but will decree immediately to restrain such acts. Held.
The evidence establishes reasonable grounds to believe that the proposed
use will result in a nuisance. Turtle et al. v. Fitchett et al. 56 Wash.
Dec. 249 (1930).
There can be no doubt that the rule of law as stated by the court is
well supported by the authorities. Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 111
Pac. 879, Ann. Cas. 1912B 1128, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 608 (1910) Densmore v.
Evergreen Camp. No. 147 W 0. W., 61 Wash. 230, 112 Pac. 255, Ann. Cas.
1912B 1206, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 608 (1910) Edmunds v. Duff, 280 Pa. St.
355, 124 Atl. 489, 33 A. L. R. 719 (1924) Hamilton Corporation v. Julian,
130 Md. 597, 101 Atl. 558 (1917). But, "An injunction, being the strong arm
of the court, should never be granted except in a clear case of irreparable
injury, and with full conviction on the part of the court of its urgent
Morse v. O'Connell, 7 Wash. 117, 34 Pac. 426 (1893)
necessity."
Bouchaert v. State Board of Land Com., 84 Wash. 356, 145 Pac. 848 (1915)
Hodgeman v. Olsen, 86 Wash. 615, 150 Pac. 1122, L. R. A. 1916A 739 (1915)
An amusement place is not necessarily a nuisance, but may be conducted
as to become one. Roclville, etc. Co. v. Koelsch, (Conn.) 96 Atl 947
(1916)
City of Lynchburg v. Peters, (Vir.) 133 S. E. 674 (1926).
As in most nuisance cases, the real problem is not one of law, but of
fact; that is, whether the facts show that "reasonable grounds exist to
believe the proposed use will result in a nuisance." In holding that the
defendant's resort will constitute a nuisance, the court relies on the fact
that adjoining property would depreciate in value, but it immediately concedes that this may be a case of damnum absque snjursa, which automatically defeats the importance of that question. The decision also points out
the testimony that the lake might become an unhealthy place in which
to bathe, but it is shown that the county health officers have full power
to control the situation, if in fact the lake does become insanitary. It is
submitted that if the decision is based on the ground that the lake might
become unhealthy, the court is assuming a purely administrative function, which is the proper duty of other officials, and is granting injunctive relief when no necessity exists, contrary to well established principIes. The third basis of its finding is best stated in the words of the
court, "Courts can scarcely refrain from taking judicial notice that some
persons who are so aquatically inclined (i. e., swimmers and users of
defendant's boats) would from time to time take undue liberties with or
upon the property of persons living along the lake." If by this statement,
the court means to say that it is physically impossible for the owner of a
resort to run his place in such a way as to prevent swimmers and users
of his boats from becoming nuisances, then it is submitted that the court
is taking judicial notice of that which is not a fact. But, if the court
means to say, which seems more logical, that the court will take judicial
notice that the defendant's patrons would from time to time annoy persons living along the lake, and that they might go so far as to become
nuisances, we are then reduced to the fundamental question whether the
possibility that defendant's patrons might become nuisances, creates a
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reasonable ground to believe that defendant's place will constitue a nuisance.
The following facts must be kept in mind: The defendant is found, in
good faith, to intend to operate his place in an orderly manner. There is
no showing, except for his lack of experience, that the defendant is unqualified to run such a place in such a manner. It is granted by the court
that the ordinary noise resulting from the attendance of people at a recreation grounds, conducting themselves in an orderly manner, would not
constitute a nuisance. The same must be true of persons using the lake,
It is submitted
since it is navigable and is, therefore, a public highway
that since an amusement park, run in an orderly manner, is not a nuisance and since there is no evidence to show that defendant would be
unable to run it in such a manner, it should be presumed that the defendant's patrons will not act in such a way as to constitute a nuisance.
To appreciate how far the court has gone beyond any previous cases,
in finding that the facts herein create a reasonable certainty that a nuisance will be created, one need merely examine the cases upon which the
court relies as authority for its holding. In Densmore v. Evergreen Camp,
supra, the court enjoined the creation of an underktaking establishment
in a residential district, where the testimony, while disputed, was strong
that noxious odors and gases would permeate the homes of the plaintiffs,
that there would be danger of infection and contagion, and that the holding of funeral services would seriously spoil the enjoyment of the plaintiff's home. In Everett v. Paschall, supra, the court enjoined the erection
of a tuberculosis sanitarium in a residential district, on the ground that
a general, reasonable fear of contagion will justify an injunction, where it
was shown by the evidence that such a general dread existed. In Perry vi.
Seattle, 116 Wash. 437, 200 Pac. 336, 203 Pac. 40, the city was enjoined
from erecting a reservoir with a 56-foot embankment in a residential district, where it was shown that there was some possibility of a break, and
that if it did break, loss of life would be inevitable. In Edmunds 'v. Duff,
su'pra, the court issued an injunction against an amusement company
which intended to erect music pavilions, merry-go-rounds, scenic railways,
shooting galleries, dance halls, theaters, electric fountains. The case of
Hamiltan Corp. v. Julian, supra, was tried on a demurrer, and the court
held simply that the plaintiff court enjoin the erection of bowling alleys,
if he showed with reasonable certainty that it would be a nuisance.
Whether or not it would be a nuisance, the court did not attempt to say
In Eckels v. Weibly. 232 Pa. St. 547, 81 Atl. 645, 7 A. L. R. 739, and in
Mason, v. Deitering, 132 Mo. App. 26, the court enjoined the erection of
stables for large numbers of cattle and horses in a residential district. In
Goodrich v. Starrett, 108 Wash. 437, 184 Pac. 220" Andrews v. Perry, 126
Misc. Rep. 320, 216 N. Y. Supp. 537 Phelps v. Winch, 140 N. E. 847, 28
A. L. R. 1169- Deevers v. Lando, 285 S. W (Mo.) 746, and Gilbough 'a.
West Side Amusement Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 27, 53 Atl. 289, which were the
only other cases cited by the court in support of its conclusion, the principal question was not in issue, since the cases involved attempt to enjoin
establishments which were already in operation.
The preceding group of cases undoubtedly supports the rule laid down,
that the establishment of an enterprise will be enjoined if it is reasonably
certain that the proposed use will result in a nuisance, but it is submitted
that not one case cited in the opinion will support the holding that the
facts here involved bring this case within the rule. In every case cited
by the court it was found that the business or enterprise enjoined would
constitute a nuisance because of uncontrollable factors in the nature of the
proposed undertaking, even though run in an orderly, scientific and approved manner. But in the principal case the proposed use of the defendant's grounds and of the lake cannot constitute a nuisance if used in an
orderly fashion. The case, therefore, does not involve the question of
whether the proposed business would be a nuisance because of its nature,
as in the cases cited, but is entirely a question of the defendant's ability
as a manager of such a resort. It is submitted that if the court is going

RECENT CASES
to issue injunctions solely because in its opinion the defendant will not
be able to run his business in an orderly manner, when it is a matter of
common knowledge that some managers can operate such places without
constituting a nuisance, it is not only opening the door to interminable
litigation, but it is grossly abusing its power, since it is issuing an
injunction on the basis of a finding as to the defendant's personal ability,
which from its very nature must be questionable, and cannot be termed
reasonable grounds to believe that the proposed use will constitute a nuisance.
C. A. E.
EXCHANGE OF PRoPEiTY-REsCIssIoN FOR FRAUD-RELIANCE-KNOWLEDGE

OF PANTIES.

Plaintiff made an agreement with defendant, acting as agent

of another, for a mutual transfer of lands; plaintiff being in California,

where he then resided, and defendant in Seattle. Plaintiff came to Seattle
shortly thereafter, saw defendant's property, and in fact lived in the
house about three weeks before the transfer was completed. He now seeks
to rescind the contract, claiming fraud on the part of the defendant in
representing that the property was in "First class condition" and a "Desirable location." Held. There was. no condition represented which
plaintiff did not become aware of, by personal observation before the
completion of the contract; therefore, no fraud on which to base recission.
Savinovich v. Winbigler 55 Wash. Dec. 245, 284 Pac. 77 (1930).
The requirements of fraud are: material representation, made with
knowledge of its falsity, or recklessly, with intent that the representation
shall be acted on; and reliance by the plaintiff with resulting injury.
Paie v. Kiel, 228 Fed. 527 (1923) Ochs v. Woods, 221 N. Y. 335, 117 N. E.
305 (1917). The requirements of intent to defraud has been done away
with in this jurisdiction. Starwch v. Ernst, 100 Wash. 198, 170 Pac. 584
(1918)
The representation as to location is material, rescission being
given for misrepresentation of the avenue on which a lot is located, Day
v. Taylor, 123 Wash. 286, 212 Pac. 170 (1923), or as to desirable location, Wiley v. Siimons, 259 Mass. 159, 156 N. E. 23 (1927), if such statements induced purchase. One can also have rescission for fraudulent representations concerning the existence of a condition, McCracken v. Bangs,
148 Ark. 655, 229 S. W 730 (1921), or of the character of the land, Lespold
v. Epler 198 Ill. App. 618 (1916), when they would wholly or in part
induce vendor to act. In this case, the lack of the element of reliance
caused the plaintiff's defeat. The reliance necessary must not only be
actually present, but must be a reasonable reliance on the facts. In re
Hunter-Rand Co., 241 Fed. 175 (1917). Where there is no opportunity to
discover the misrepresentation, the purchaser may rescind for fraud.
Houder v. Reynolds, 195 Mich. 256, 161 N. W 856 (1917). Conversely, if
there have been misrepresentations, but no actual reliance thereon, the
vendee cannot rescind merely on the strength of the fact such statements
were made. Berrendo IrrtgatedFarms Co. v. Jacobs, 23 N. M. 290, 168 Pac.
483 (1917). The courts do disagree, however, in the cases -where there
is no investigation, but there could have been one revealing the fraud,
had the vendee wished to make it. Some hold that one who buys property
has a right to rely on representations, even though he could have investigated, and can sue if defrauded. Eufemia v. Moan, 206 N. Y. S. 185
(1923) Dickey v. Dunn, 80 Cal. App. 724, 252 Pac. 770 (1927). Others
do not allow the vendee to rescind for fraud when he has the means of
investigating, but does not use them.

Dean v. Merchants & Farmers

Bank, 24 Ga. App. 475, 101 S.E. 196 (1919) Hones v. Herring, 16 S.W
(2d) 325 (1929).
The vendee in the instant case was on the property, not only for a
superficial examination, but for actual residence for a time; so that a
knowledge, or investigation, of the facts must have come to him. The
contention of the defendant is that this knowledge of conditions negatives
any claim of reliance he might advance, even though the defendant did
make misrepresentations which, if they. had been relied on in good
faith, might have been grounds for rescission. The merit of such a
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plea in every case lies in the facts of the case itself. A strong case, for
this jurisdiction, of justification in relying on vendor's statements is
Bickford v. Uthe, 134 Wash. 636, 239 Pac. 898 (1925) where a woman
who had lived for some years in the vicinity of the land sold was allowed
to rely on representations of the seller that the orchard was not in a
frost pocket, and would not be killed by frost. There was, however, no
evidence of actual inspection of the particular premises. Generally one
examining land before purchase, so that he can see its condition, cannot
claim he relied on the vendor's representations. Sims v. Robinson, 142
Wash. 555, 253 Pac. 788 (1927). But special circumstances will change
the rule. Investigation does not cut off reliance where the person investigating really knows nothing of the use of the land, and must rely
on the representations about facts not readily ascertainable even by investigation. Bliss v. Clebanck, 136 Wash. 32, 238 Pac. 979 (1925)
Nor is
relief denied where statement of general characteristics is made as one
of fact, to induce purchase, if there is actual reliance thereon, the plaintiff in the case of Rockham v. Koch, 125 Wash. 451, 216 Pac. 835 (1923)
being held entitled to rely, where there was an honest misrepresentation
of the acreage in an enclosure, even though he looked at the land, the
statement being made as of fact. But one of experience had been held not
to rely justifiably on a statement as to the number of acres of a tract
cleared, when he saw the land. Mackay v. Peterson, 122 Wash. 550, 211
Pac. 716 (1922).
Reliance is the criterion, the vendee being allowed
no action of fraud where he has not actually relied on the representations
of the vendor, as a reasonable person. Johnson v. Chesser 129 Wash.
580, 225 Pac. 442 (1924). Had the vendee never seen the premises, he
might readily have recovered, but with his ample chance to investigate,
as a dweller on the property, he cannot reasonably complain that the very
facts which were misrepresented were not those most forcibly brought
to his attention, barring relief.
W J. P
CARRIRs-GRATUITOUS

PASS-LmIITATION

OF LIABILITY.

The plaintiff

was issued a series of free railroad passes; one entitling him to ride from
Seattle, Washington, to the city of Omaha, Nebraska, another from Omaha
to Minneapolis, Minnesota, and the last pass entitled him to travel from
Minneapolis to his destination at Wood Lake, within the state of Minnesota.
The plaintiff was injured while riding on this last pass, the back of which
provided that the holder "assumes all risk of accident and injury to person." On appeal, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
stipulation contained in the pass exempting the carrier from liability for
negligence was valid. The court were of the opinion that this was an
interstate pass and subject to the federal law, but said that even if it
were an intrastate pass they would not recognize the repeated decisions
by the Minnesota Supreme Court holding such exemptions void as against
public policy and unless there was a controlling state statute, they would
follow the federal rule. Bush v. Bremer 36 Fed (2d) 191 (1929).
The decision is undoubtedly correct if the pass is construed as an
interstate pass. The Supreme Court of the United States, in its interpretation of that provision of the Hepburn Act, limiting the issuance of free
interstate passes to certain classes of persons, has held that by this legislative enactment, Congress took over the whole subject of free interstate
passes to the exclusion of state laws, not only superceding the state laws
as to what passes might be issued, but also as to their limitations and
effect upon the rights of the passenger and carrier respectively. Kansas
City So. Ry. v. Van Zant, 260 U. S. 459, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 176, 67 L. ed. 348
(1923). The federal cases lay down the rule that a stipulation in a gratuitous pass for interstate transportation, exempting the carrier from
liability for negligence, is valid. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Adams, 192 U. S.
440, 48 L. ed. 513, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 408 (1904)
Charleston & Western
Carolina Ry. v. Thompson, 234 U. S. 576, 34 Sup. Ct. 694, 58 L. ed. 1476
(1914).
But a more difficult question is presented if the free pass in the
principal case is construed as merely an intrastate pass. No attempt was
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made by Congress in passing the Hepburn Act to regulate the issuance
of intrastate passes, and it would seem that the issuance and validity
of stipulations or conditions annexed to such passes would be a matter of
state determination and control. As in the principal case, the United
States Supreme Court has recogmzed the validity of an express state
statute, prohibiting a carrier from limiting its liability for negligence in
a free intrastate pass. New York CentralRailroad Co. v. Mohney, 40 Sup.
Ct. 287, 252 U. S. 152, 64 L. ed. 502, 9 A. L. R. 496 (1920). The intimation by
the court in the Bremer case that they would not follow the decisions
of the state supreme court rendering such stipulations in a free intrastate
pass invalid, would seem to give rise to an inconsistency, inasmuch as it
is clearly recognized that a legislative enactment would be controlling,
yet the federal court would not be bound by decisions of the state court.
A review of the decisions reveal that the United States Supreme Court
has consistently followed the doctrine that in matters of general law, the
federal courts will exercise their own judgment, uncontrolled by state
decisions. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. ed. 865 (1842) Baltimore d 0.
R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 37 L. ed. 772, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 914 (1892)
Black and White T. & T. Co. v. Brown and Yellow T. & T. Co., 276 U. S.
518, 48 Sup. Ct. 404, 72 L. ed. 681 (1927). It follows, therefore, as a necessary conclusion, that the states may legislate as to the validity of conditions and stipulations annexed to free intrastate passes exempting the carrier from liability and such statutes will be enforced by the federal courts.
But in the absence of such legislation, where cases involving this question are tried and instituted in a state court, decisions rendering such
stipulations invalid will not be controlling when appealed to or reviewed
by the Supreme Court of the United States. In view of the fact that the
principal case has adopted this line of reasoning, it would seem to be
correctly decided.
0. .H
EQurrY-REromATioN OF INSTRUMENTS-MISTAKE OF LAW.
Thirteen
railroads became associated in the organization of the Union Railway
Company, each paying one-thirteenth of the maintenance cost. Two of
these led out from Indianapolis, each of which was encumbered by a
mortgage. They consolidated and a consolidated mortgage was put on
them. The plaintiff of this action became the owner of the railroads by
purchase at the foreclosure sale. The foreclosure decree provided that the
purchaser might elect whether to accept or reject any existing contract
affecting the property. The plaintiff elected to retain the contract of one
of the railroads with the Union Company but to reject the other. Later
it was held that the Union Company was entitled to collect two shares of
the maintenance cost from the plaintiff. The plaintiff seeks to be relieved
from his election and to reject both contracts because his first election
was made under a mistake of law. Held. That equity will often permit
obligations to be reformed or rescinded because based on a mistake of law.
Cincinnati, I. & W R. Co. v. Indianapolis Union Ry. Co. et al., 36 Fed.
(2d) 323 (1929)
Courts of equity early laid down the rule that equity would not relieve
in case of a mistake of law. Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East. 469, 6 R. R. 479
(1802)
The reason for this doctrine was the maxim "ignorance of the
law is no excuse." The federal courts have generally followed this rule.
Utermekle v. Norment, 197 U. S. 40, 49 L. Ed. 655, 25 Sup. Ct. 291 (1904).
However the courts will seize upon any possible excuse in order to give
relief. Perhaps the only well supported holding now is that one cannot
recover money which has been paid under a mistake of law. Doll v. Earle,
65 Barb. 298 (1874). There is one exception even to this rule, however,
and that is that money paid under mistake of law by public officials must
be refunded. Wisconsin Central R'd. v. United States, 164 U. S. 190, 41
L. Ed. 399, 17 Sup. Ct. 45 (1896).
The courts have granted relief under guise of many exceptions. Some
courts have relieved where there is a mistake of law by one party known
to the other and taken advantage of by him. Rowe v. James, 71 Wash. 267,
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128 Pac. 529 (1912)
Others have made a distinction between a mistake of
private legal right and a mistake of a general law. Lansdowne v. Lansdowne, 1 Madd. 116, 1 Jac. & Walk 522, 15 R. R. 225 (1730).
This is
usually applied where by mistake of law one who has bought what is really
his. Bungham v. Bingham, 1 Ves. 126 (1784). Another grounds for exception is in the case of the written agreement not carrying out the intention
of the parties as was previously expressed in a parol agreement because
of some mistake in reducing it to writing. Hazard v. Warner 112 Wash.
687, 211 Pac. 732, 31 A. L. R. 381 (1923)
Courts will even take into consideration the hardship which may be caused by a mistake of law. Ryon
v. John Wanamaker New York, Inc., 116 Misc. Rep. 91, 190 N. Y. S. 250
(1921)
Courts have also said that a mistake of foreign law is a mistake
of fact and have relieved against such a mistake. Osineup v. Henthorn,
89 Kan. 58, 130 Pac. 652, 46 L. R. A. (n.s.) 175, Ann. Cas. 1914C 1262 (1921).
Some states, for example, California, have passed statutes granting relief
for mistake of law. Deering, Civ. Code of Cal., sec. 1578.
One means the courts have seized upon to avoid applying this doctrine
is to find some mistake of fact, no matter how slight, involved -in the
mistake of law and for this reason give relief. Usher v. Waddingham, 62
Conn. 412, 26 Atl. 538 (1892). There was some element of a mistake of fact
in the principal case. The plaintiff was mistaken as to the fact that the
consolidated road had so acted as to merge the two contracts into one.
However, this case openly states that equity will relieve for a mistake of
law. Most courts are loath to go against the weight of authority and
accept the statement that equity will relieve for mistake of law, especially
as there are so many exceptions that justice and equity usually can be
reached by means of these exceptions. Even in those cases where courts
have said they would relieve for a mistake of law there were elements in
the case which would bring it within one of the many exceptions. When the
mistake is one purely of law and there are no elements to bring it within
an exception, they have refused relief. As this rule is the outgrowth of
dicta, the instant case by stating that mistake of law is a ground for equitable relief is adopting a position which leads away from the confusion and
lack of frankness on the part of the courts and is therefore justifiable.
There really is no logical reason for a different result in case of mistake
of fact and of law Probably a better way than leaving it to courts to
reach the desired result is to accomplish it by legislation.
J. F

